have been brought before the Commission.
3 It is also clear that this article is not a report on the human rights situation in the former Communist countries. Nevertheless, as the article will show, some patterns of the ways in which applicants from the former Communist countries try to use the Convention can be identified. One of the article's contributions is indeed in trying to understand the hopes which the citizens (and lawyers) of the new democracies have of the Strasbourg organs. In addition, the study of the case law raises some more general questions about the role the Convention may play in the transition to democracy.
4

II. The Time Limits and Attempts to Overcome them
Many cases coming from the ex-Communist countries were rejected 'incompatible ratione temporis '. 5 These rejections were often the result of the fact that the applications dealt with events that happened before the relevant country had recognized the right of individual petition under Article 25 of the Convention. 6 The other reason for this kind of rejection was that more than the maximum six months had passed since the final decision in the matter that was the subject of the complaint. 7 These two reasons were in most cases two sides of the same coin, as complaints were usually brought more than half a year after the domestic final decision because the relevant country had only recognized the right of individual petition after that time limit had passed.
The applications which concern events which happened before the relevant dates, and therefore incompatible ratione temporis, may be seen as reflecting a hope of the applicants (or their lawyers) that the Commission may help undo the wrongs of the ancien regime. Obviously, the new countries have joined the Convention after they have already become democracies which respect basic human rights, as those are preconditions to join, 8 so it may be expected that the more severe human rights violations in those countries had happened before they joined. So while the importance of the Convention as part of the transition to democracy should not be underestimated, it is interesting to discover that people's expectations are higher in that they lodge complaints about earlier events, hoping that the Convention may not only be prospective, but also backward looking and helpful in correcting the past. I shall return to this element with specific examples later. A recurring pattern that is seen in the Commission's decisions, is the attempt by applicants to overcome the time limit problem. They often do it by trying to introduce some additional measure after the entry into force of the Convention in their county, so that they can petition against the decision given in regard of that measure, as if it were the 'final decision' within the meaning of Article 26. The Commission has repeatedly rejected these attempts, saying that the additional measure is not an effective one, and thus the date of the 'final decision' is the earlier date of the decision given in the last effective appeal.
For example, in numerous cases from Poland, the relevant events happened before the dates of ratification and of recognition of the right of individual petition. The applicants requested an extraordinary appeal and the request was rejected. In all of these cases the Commission refused to see the rejection of the extraordinary appeal, which happened after the relevant dates, as the 'final decision' within the meaning of Article 26, since it was not an effective remedy, and declared the application as inadmissible for being incompatible ratione temporis. 9 In other cases the complaints concerned the rejection of the request for an extraordinary appeal, and the Commission decided that there was no right to such appeal under the Convention.
10
In many cases from Hungary the same pattern returns: the applicants try to add an additional act, so that they can 'extend' the relevant events to after the entry into force of the Convention in regard to their country, but the Commission has rejected these attempts. For example, Application 21888/93 n dealt with a civil litigation concerning property. The last decision was given in 1988. The applicants petitioned the Hungarian Supreme Court in this matter after the ratification date, but the Commission held that this petition was not an effective remedy and thus would not be seen as the 'final decision '. 12 Poland and Hungary are the two countries where this method of trying to 'extend' the events recur in many cases. In a similar case from the Slovak Republic, the applicant tried to do the same thing by writing a letter to the Ministry of Justice, but the Commission held that this was not an effective remedy, and the application was declared incompatible ratione temporis.
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In another Slovak case, the Commission, while deciding the case was inadmissible for time reasons, held that an additional application to the prosecutor-general in the matter, was not an effective resort, and thus did not change the result of incompatible ratione temporis. In a Czech Republic case, the Commission reached a similar conclusion as to the ineffectiveness of a remedy tried after the relevant dates.
14 As already noted above, a typical pattern in the cases surveyed, is the attempt to use the Convention not only for recent events in the new democracies, but also for undoing the wrongs of the Communist regimes. Indeed, the shots at 'extending' events that happened before the relevant dates are manifestations of this attempt. In the next section we will see how this theme recurs specifically in the sphere of property.
III. Property Cases
A significant number of cases from the new democracies which have so far been decided by the Commission have to do with citizens' claims regarding property, especially property that was expropriated by the Communist regimes. Here, we see again the hope that by joining the Convention a tool is created to undo or remedy the past. As we shall see, to the extent that citizens of the ex-Communist countries put their hopes in the Convention in this respect, they were, in the cases decided so far, doomed to disappointment. It is important to note that cases with property themes form the largest group among the Commission's decisions which were given on the merits of the issues, and with an elaborated reasoning.
A case that came before the Commission from Poland dealt with trade union branches ('Solidarnosc' Trade Union at the 'Zgoda' Cooperative and at the 'Fresco' Plant) which had had their property seized after the introduction of martial law in 1981. In 1991 they applied for restitution. The Restitution Commission decided that compensation should be paid by the Independent Trade Union to which the property had been transferred, but the applicants argued that the sum of the compensation was insufficient, and invoked the property clause of the Convention, in Article 1 of Protocol I. 15 The Supreme Administrative Court in Poland dismissed the applicants' appeals in April and May 1994 respectively.
In this case the Commission held that both the expropriation and compensation happened before the entry into force of Protocol 1 in respect of Poland. The 'Solidarnosc' cases illustrate the limits of the role that the Convention can play in the transition to democracy: in this case, not only did the expropriation happen before Poland had ratified the Convention, but also the decisions regarding compensation, and the appeal on those decisions, were all delivered before the relevant date. 18 In those circumstances, the Commission could not intervene. It is interesting to observe here that when the Member State, in this case Poland, was quick to take corrective measures for the Communist past before it ratified the Convention, the Commission was precluded from checking if those measures were corrective 'enough'. It is hard to assess whether the result would have been different had the compensation proceedings in Poland occurred after the entry into force of Protocol 1. If that had been the case the Commission would have had to decide whether it was going to scrutinize the compensation for expropriation of property through Article 1 of Protocol 1, or whether it was going to interpret Article 1 more narrowly, i.e. only to protect from expropriation as such, but not to allow an assessment by the Commission of compensation. In any case, it is clear that at least from a time perspective, if the corrective measures had happened after the entry into force, they would have been within the Commission's jurisdiction. Indeed, in Application 24559/94, 19 the Commission looked into a complaint regarding proceedings held in Poland on the issue of restoration of property seized in 1951. The applicant complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, 20 that his case had not been decided within a reasonable time. The Commission held the case as admissible. This case illustrates the possibility of review, by the Commission, of restitution processes. Nevertheless it is unclear whether the Commission will be willing to go beyond examining the procedural aspects of these processes. As a matter of policy regarding when is the right time for a new democracy to join the Convention, one should note that the earlier it happens, the more chances that the 'correction' processes would be open to scrutiny by the Commission.
The majority of the property cases decided by the Commission in applications from former Communist countries, came from the Czech Republic and Hungary.
A. Czech Republic
Most of the property cases from the Czech Republic involved demands from applicants whose property had been confiscated by the Communist regime. 23 also dealt with the case of an applicant who asked for the restitution of goods which were confiscated in the past. As in the previous case discussed, the applicant was refused because of his residency in Switzerland. In this case the applicant invoked, in addition to the Articles invoked in 22926/93, Articles 2(2) and 3 of Protocol 4 24 and Article 14 of the Convention, 25 as he argued he was discriminated aganist based on his residency. This case may illustrate the problems of returning property to previous owners, as the property was now being held by two agricultural cooperatives. The Commission did not go into the merits of the case because it determined the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies, as the domestic constitutional court rejected the appeal to it for mere formal reasons. Rejection for non-exhaustion was also the fate of the Application in 23129/93, 26 which again dealt with a demand for a return of property in a non-judicial process, following an annulment of the conviction that caused the confiscation. attempted to get back property that was confiscated in 1948. The authorities in the Czech Republic determined that the applicant did not fulfil the requirements of the relevant Czech restitution laws. The applicant invoked Article 6(1) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol 1. The Commission took note of the fact that the application did not concern a confiscation of property, but rather an action of restitution. It held that the property right in Article 1 Protocol 1 does not as such include the right to acquire property. If the applicant did not have any rights created under the restitution laws because she failed to fulfil their requirements, then she cannot argue for a violation of property rights in the confiscated property. The application was held as incompatible ratione materiae. The upshot from the Commission decision in 25893/94, is that the issue of restitution of confiscated property remains at the discretion of the Member States: the Commission in this case did not question the conditions for restitution imposed in domestic Czech law. An applicant does not have a right in confiscated property unless such a right is created by a domestic restitution law.
B. Hungary
Unlike the Czech property cases (in which arguments were made concerning some official rehabilitation procedure, and which may be viewed as concerning property rights that may potentially have been created under the rehabilitation procedure) in the Hungarian cases, the applicants tried to argue that Article 1 of Protocol 1 includes a right to have their property returned, even when there was no domestic procedure that may have created such rights. In 22016/93, 30 the Commission dealt with an expropriation dating from 1945. The expropriation act itself was of course incompatible ratione temporis. As to the applicant's claim about the lack of restitution, the Commission held that the Convention does not guarantee such a right or other right to reparation of injuries which are not in themselves violations of the Convention. Hence, because the expropriation has not been a violation, for the reason that Hungary at the time was not a member of the Convention, there is no right under the Convention to undo it or compensate for it.
31
In 23318/94 32 the Commission similarly held that it cannot create, by way of interpretation of Article 6(1), substantive rights that are not existing in the country concerned: the case dealt with real property that was expropriated in 1952. In 1991 the constitutional court decided the land expropriation law from 1952 was unconstitutional, but this decision had no retroactive effect. Therefore, the applicant's complaint under Article 6(1) and Article 1 of Protocol 1 was for rights not recognized in Hungarian law. This series of cases again illustrates an attempt to use the Convention as a mechanism for undoing the deeds of the previous regimes, and, as in the other cases, this attempt has failed. By deciding there is no right under the Convention to compensation for acts that are not violations because they happened before the relevant dates, the Commission has confirmed that the Convention is only forward looking, and will not be given a retrospective interpretation. The outcome of these decisions, is that it is left up to the ex-Communist countries to decide whether they want to make positive acts of restitution. However, once they start taking these actions, there is a possibility that those acts can be scrutinized by the Commission.
Another attempt to bring an' old expropriation into the time frame of the Convention failed in 21344/93. 33 Here the applicant argued that the expropriation of land that happened in 1945 was a continuous act, but the Commission chose to see it as an instantaneous act, and thus declared the application incompatible ratione temporis. As in other cases, also here the Commission held that Article 1 of Protocol 1 does not guarantee restitution or reparation of injuries which are not in themselves violations of the Convention, and rejected this argument as incompatible ratione materiae.
IV. Cases Concerning Public Officials and the Change of Regime
A number of cases from the ex-Communist countries involve public officials, and appointment or dismissal of officials. In some of these cases, it is clear that the facts have to do with the move from the ancien rigime and the way that members of that regime were to be treated afterwards. In some other cases, it is much less clear from reading the Commission's decisions, what the background circumstances were, and if the issue was related to the change of the regime. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, I shall discuss these cases in this section. By doing so I do not intend to indicate that these cases necessarily have any connection to the special circumstances of the ex-Communist States.
A. Bulgaria
Application 21915/93 34 came from the former Bulgarian Prime Minister, Andrei Karlov Lukanov, at the time of the application serving as a member of the National Assembly. Previously, between 1986-1990 he had served as Deputy Prime Minister. His parliamentary immunity was suspended in 1992 and he was detained on the charge of participating, as Deputy Prime Minister, in decisions granting assistance to under-developed countries (e.g. Nicaragua, Cuba, etc.), which had adverse effects on the Bulgarian economy. His appeal against detention was dismissed by the Supreme Court in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer, and a later application for release for health reasons was also rejected. Meanwhile, the prosecutor had prohibited the applicant from speaking alone with his lawyer, after he published an article in a newspaper. In December 1992 the National Assembly reversed its decision to authorize his detention, and he was released. He claimed that he had been detained without reasonable ground of any offence, claiming that the decisions to grant assistance were collective decisions taken in accordance with the Government's policy and UN recommendations. He argued that the proceedings against him were a political reprisal, and their purpose was to restrict his rights as a member of the National Assembly. The Commission held the application under Article 5(l)(c) 35 and Article 18 36 of the Convention admissible, as it was competent to examine the grounds for arrest and detention given in the Supreme Court's decision from 13 July 1992, in so far as they remained unchanged after the entry into force of the Convention as regards Bulgaria on 7 September 1992. Claims under Article 6 were rejected incompatible ratione temporis because the Commission could not check the Supreme Court's decision of 13 July 1992; the same applied to the claim under Article 10 37 about the prohibition on writing articles and speaking with a lawyer.
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This case dealt with the problems which arise in the way the new democracies handle the officials of the old regimes. It raises the question of what steps the new governments can take against those who acted on behalf of the previous governments, and what are the limits on those steps. By choosing to see the Article 5 issue as continuous, the Commission opened its door to a review of the case on its merits, and it became the first case from a former Communist country to be held (partly) admissible. 39 Another Bulgarian case that involved former government officials is Application 24571/94 and 24572/94. 40 The applicants in these cases were Grigor Stoitchkov, who was Deputy Prime Minister of Bulgaria from 1978 until 1989, and Lubomir Shindarov, who was Deputy Minister of Public Health from 1981 until 1989. They were indicted in Bulgaria in 1991 for failures to undertake the necessary protection measures against the effects of nuclear radiation, which had permeated into Bulgaria following the Chernobyl accident in 1986. They were convicted and their conviction was upheld in appeal. The applicants complained to the Commission of the alleged unfairness of the criminal proceedings, of violations of their defence rights, and of the alleged partiality of the courts. They invoked Article 6(1) of the Convention, and Article 6(3) which deals with the rights of people charged with criminal offences. In addition Article 14 was invoked in conjunction with Article 6.
The Commission looked into the merits of the case (excluding events that occurred before the entry of the Convention into force in respect of Bulgaria). It held that the facts of the case indicated that the applicants did enjoy the rights to defend themselves, and that there was no indication that in the appellate proceedings the applicants could not sufficiently put forward their point of view or that the proceedings were unfairly conducted. Furthermore, the Commission did not find any indication of judicial prejudice of political bias in the case. The Commission has thus held the application to be inadmissible.
An additional Bulgarian case that may have to do with the transition to democracy is Application 27608/95. 41 In this case, the 'Movement for Democratic Kingdom' petitioned against the Bulgarian authorities refusal to register it under the Act on Political Parties. The applicant invoked Article 11 of the Convention. 42 The Commission found no violation of Article 11, as the association was not prevented from engaging in political activity, but only from running in elections. Furthermore, the applicant could, the Commission noted, rectify the procedural omissions because of which its registration was refused, or send a fresh petition for registration once it had complied with the pertinent requirements under the law.
B. Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
A case from the former CSFR involved a federal law from May 1990 which passed the property of the Communist party into the hands of the State. However, publishing rights were not transferred, and thus the ownership but not the publishing rights of the Communist Party paper (for which the applicant worked) were transferred. The journalists refused to work for a paper run by a political party. The applicant lodged complaints concerning the arrest of a third person, but these were rejected as the applicant did not claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention in this context. The applicant also argued that civil servants tried to intimidate the opposition press, but the Commission found no indication that the applicant's freedom of speech was interfered with. 
C. Hungary
A Hungarian case dealt with an applicant that who joined the fire brigade in 1969, and became deputy-chief of a county brigade in 1991. In that year, he was given a car that he used for personal purposes. He put forward Article 6 arguments about disciplinary proceedings that were taken against him in this matter, and also Article 14 arguments. The Commission held the case incompatible ratione temporis, because the last proceeding happened before the relevant date. 44 It is not clear from the Commission's decision whether this case has to do with the change of the regime. Any assumption that this was some kind of a 'hunt' of officials appointed by that regime, and a manifestation of a view of these officials as corrupt, would be a mere speculation.
D. Poland
In Application 25395/94, 45 the applicant wanted a certificate that he was not an informant for the Communist secret police. The Minister of Justice had refused to give such a certificate, in a decision on which no appeal was possible. The applicant invoked Article 6. The Commission held that there was no 'civil right' to have such a certificate, even if there is one for protection of good reputation. Hence, there was no violation of Article 6, and the case was held to be incompatible ratione materiae.
E. Slovak Republic
In Application 24157/94, 46 the applicant's complaint concerned a Slovak law that prevented persons who were affiliated with the State Security (former secret police) from holding certain important posts. The applicant complained that the law in question is discriminatory, and that by its application he was convicted of a criminal offence and incurred the penalty of being banned from certain posts in State organs. Specifically, the applicant complained that as the result of the application of the said law he was discriminated against and that his right to promotion in employment was violated. He invoked a variety of Convention articles. The Commission held that in the present case no criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant. The Ministry of the interior issued the applicant a certificate alleging that he was registered as a person mentioned in the contested law. However, the issue of this certificate is not a criminal charge within Article 6. Regarding the applicant's complaint of discrimination, the Commission noted that Article 14 of the Convention applies only to the enjoyment of rights guaranteed by the Convention itself, and that the access to civil service is not such a right. Therefore, after Aeyal M. Gross rejecting some of the applicant's other arguments, the Commission found the application to be inadmissible.
F. Other Cases
Other cases that dealt with personnel issues, but where it is unclear whether there is any connection to the change of the regime, dealt with compensation for retirement from the army, 47 refusal to admit to the bar, 48 dismissal from a university, 49 refusal to re-appoint a judge who left for family reasons, 50 and a decision by the Ministry of Justice not to forward a candidate's name for election as a professional judge.
51 A case from Romania involved the authorities refusal to allow the former king into the country.
52 All of these cases were held to be inadmissible.
V. Cases Concerning Tribunals Decisions Before the Ratification of the Convention
In three cases brought against the former CSFR, the applicants sought to undo decisions given by tribunals before the Convention entered into force in that country. In 21026/92 the applicant tried to re-open proceedings concerning his claim for industrial accident compensation from 1979; in 21027/92 the applicant tried to appeal a decision from 1990 concerning his claim for compensation for bad medical treatment; and in 21029/90 the applicant tried to challenge proceedings that determined his incapacity to act, which took place in 1976, 1983 and 1990. 53 All three complaints were held inadmissible for various reasons.
VL Other Cases
There is a growing number of Commission decisions against some of the new democracies which are not necessarily typical of the special circumstances concerning those countries and are similar to the cases coming from 'veteran' Member States. In this case too the applicant complained, inter alia, that his correspondence with the Commission was opened, read, and delayed by Polish prison authorities. The Commission declared the application to be partly admissible, as it raised serious questions under Article 8, and also decided to pursue the examination of whether the applicant's right under Article 25 was interfered with.
VII. Conclusion
Since the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe ratified the Convention, there have been a significant number of applications registered with the Commission from each joining country.
The European human rights system and try to benefit from it. Moreover, the fact that applications came from countries even before they ratified the Convention, shows that the mere prospect of joining the Convention creates hope in the new democracies, and be it out of ignorance or out of mere wishful thinking, people are resting their claims with Strasbourg even before it is possible to do so. Is it possible at this stage to draw any conclusions which would not be premature about the nature of the cases coming from the ex-Communist countries? The number of decisions delivered by the Commission with enough elaboration so we can learn from the decisions what was the nature of the case is still rather low, and we probably need to gather more data before we can draw any conclusions. In addition, it may well be the case that in the near future cases that were communicated to the respondent countries will reach the Commission, and that these cases will be of a more substantial nature than the cases which were rejected by the Commission ex parte.
However, as I have elaborated throughout the article, there are some patterns which emerge from the few cases that are before us. The strongest recurring factor is the attempt to bring under the 'wings' of the Convention events that happened before the countries ratified it. In this way, applicants have tried to use the Convention to correct wrongs done to them by the Communist regime. This happens often in the area of expropriation and confiscation of property. The applicants hope that the rays of democracy and human rights that shine from the Convention will light not only their present and future, but also their past. This hope, as I noted earlier, is doomed to be frustrated. The Convention can reinforce the democracy the citizens of the ex-Communist countries already have. 65 It cannot mend the past. So in the end the story may be the one we are familiar with: the European human rights system is good for countries which are already democracies which respect human rights. Countries which are not in this category will in any case not be able to join it, and countries which join it after they become democracies will benefit in the future, but the Convention will not be able to undo their past. Reinforcement seems to be the main theme.
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Compare this situation with the initial decision not to admit Russia to full membership of the Council of Europe. This decision followed the conclusion, by a committee of experts, that 'notwithstanding the considerable progress achieved so far, the Russian Federation does not (yet) fulfil the condition "of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms'". 
